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Abstract 
This paper introduces efficiency wages designed to provide workers with incentives to make 
appropriate effort levels, and involuntary unemployment, along the pioneering lines of Negishi 
(1979), Solow (1979), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), in a dynamic model involving heterogeneous 
agents and financial constraints as in Woodford (1986) and Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder 
(GPV, 1998). Effort varies continuously while there is unemployment insurance funded out of 
taxation of labour incomes. Increasing unemployment insurance is beneficial to employment 
along the deterministic stationary state, and can even in some cases lead to a Pareto welfare 
improvement for all agents, through general equilibrium effects, by generating higher 
individual real labour incomes, hence larger consumptions of employed and unemployed 
workers, and thus a higher production. On the other hand, the local (in)determinacy properties 
of the stationary state are opposite to those obtained in the competitive specification of the 
model (GPV, 1998) : local determinacy (indeterminacy) occurs for elasticities of capital-
efficient labour substitution lower (larger) than a quite small bound. Increasing unemployment 
insurance is more likely to lead to local indeterminacy and thus to generate dynamic 
inefficiencies due to the corresponding expectations coordination failures. 
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 1 Introduction
In his seminal contribution on The Microeconomic Foundations of Key-
nesian Macroeconomics (1979), Professor Takashi Negishi made the funda-
mental and insightful observation that in order to show a Keynesian equi-
librium involving involuntary unemployment to exist, it was not enough to
show that workers would resist wage cuts : its was necessary that ﬁrms on
the short side of the labor market be also unwilling to cut down wages, or to
hire unemployed workers at a lower wage, despite the existence of notional
labour excess supply.
T h ep a r t i c u l a ra r g u m e n th ew a st h eﬁrst to introduce along this line and
to explore theoretically in a general equilibrium framework, was that labour
productivity was likely to depend positively on nominal or real wages, so
that ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization would lead them to choose high real ”eﬃ-
ciency wages” that maximize in a sense productivity and that may generate
excess notional supply of labour (Negishi, 1979, Ch. 9). This eﬃciency wage
argument, also independently discovered by Solow (1979), has been since a
cornerstone of modern theorizing of unemployment.
The aim of this paper is, in the footsteps of Professor Negishi, to introduce
eﬃciency wage arguments and involuntary unemployment in an otherwise
standard ﬁnance constrained economy, as in Woodford (1986) and Grand-
mont, Pintus and de Vilder (GPV, 1998), and to study the consequences of
unemployment insurance (ﬁnanced by taxation of labour income) on the lo-
cal dynamics near a stationary state. We use a speciﬁcation that is directly
inspired from the ”shirking” formulation of Coimbra (1999), Alexopoulos
(2004), Nakajima (2006), Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2006), following the early
contribution of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), see also Danthine and Donaldson
(1990). The eﬃciency wage contract oﬀered by ﬁrms speciﬁe st h ew a g eo fa n
employed worker as well as the required eﬀo r tl e v e l .W ef o c u sh e r eo nas p e c -
iﬁcation involving eﬀort level as a continuous variable, in the spirit of Uhlig
and Xu (1996). An employed worker who ”shirks” faces a positive probability
of getting caught, in which case he is ﬁred and gets the unemployment insur-
ance paid to unemployed workers. Firms will choose accordingly an eﬃciency
wage contract that minimizes the real cost of labour per unit of eﬀort, subject
to a ”non-shirking condition” that states that for any given eﬀort level, the
wage paid has to be high enough to induce employed workers not to shirk.
We shall focus on the case where the resulting real wage per unit of eﬀort
generates notional excess supply on the labour market. To simplify matters,
we shall assume that the chances for a worker to get a job oﬀer in any pe-
riod do not depend on his past employment status. We abstract accordingly
4from any complication, in particular unemployment persistence, arising for
instance from job search, and from the possible inﬂuence of unemployment
insurance on the duration of unemployment.
The economy is otherwise identical to the one studied in GPV (1998) with
a competitive market for output, two assets (capital and money) and two
classes of households, ”capitalists” and ”workers”. The latter face a ﬁnance
constraint : they cannot borrow against the money receipts they will get at
the end of any period, as labour income (wages) or unemployment insurance.
So if workers are signiﬁcantly more impatient than capitalists, if the rate of
unemployment insurance is high and if workers display low risk aversion, the
households’ behaviors display the same properties as in Woodford (1986) or
GPV (1998) along equilibria near a stationary state : capitalists hold capital
and no money, while workers hold no capital and ﬁnance consumption in a
any period from the cash receipts they got one period earlier as their wage
income or unemployment insurance.
We focus in this paper on deterministic perfect foresight intertemporal
equilibria and on the properties of, and the local dynamics near, a stationary
state, leaving aside for further research the existence and properties of en-
dogenous stochastic ﬂuctuations (sunspots) that are bound to occur as well
in such a context in the case of indeterminacy. It turns out that increasing
t h er a t eo fu n e m p l o y m e n ti n s u r a n c eh a sh e r eb e n e ﬁcial eﬀects on employ-
ment, and in some cases can generate a Pareto welfare improvement for all
agents, along a stationary state. This outcome arises, despite the fact that
increasing unemployment insurance leads to eﬃciency wage contracts involv-
ing higher real wages per unit of eﬀort and thus in principle lower labour
demand, because it leads also to higher real incomes, hence consumptions, of
employed and unemployed workers, and therefore in equilibrium, to higher
production and employment. On the other hand, the local dynamics near
a stationary state is in the eﬃciency wage context considered here, in fact
governed by the same equations as in the competitive case studied by GPV
(1998), with the diﬀerence that the workers’ competitive oﬀer curve c = γ (l)
in GPV is replaced here by a function c = g(l) describing the (employed and
unemployed) workers’ equilibrium aggregate consumption as a function of
equilibrium (eﬃcient) employment. The essential diﬀerence between the two
frameworks, as far as local (in)determinacy is concerned, is that the elasticity
of the competitive oﬀer curve in GPV was bound to exceed 1(εγ > 1) as a
result of the fact that competitive labour supply should depend positively
on the real wage, while the elasticity of the consumption function g in the
eﬃciency wage case is bound to be between 0 and 1( 0< εg < 1), with εg
5close to 1 when there is little unemployment insurance and close to 0 when
unemployment insurance is large. The consequence is that, in contrast with
the competitive case of GPV where local indeterminacy could occur only
for very low and implausible elasticities of substitution between capital and
labor, local indeterminacy can be obtained in the eﬃciency wage speciﬁca-
tion considered here for elasticities of capital-labor substitution that exceed
a small lower bound. The range of such elasticities leading to local indeter-
minacy is thus quite large and empirically plausible. It includes in particular
Cobb-Douglas production functions, a conclusion that seems to be agreement
with similar ﬁndings obtained after introducing unemployment in that sort of
model, e.g. through unions, and imperfect unemployment insurance ﬁnanced
through labour income taxation as here (Dufourt, Lloyd-Braga and Modesto
(2004)). Our analysis shows in particular that local indeterminacy is more
likely to occur for low elasticities εg, i.e. when unemployment insurance is sig-
niﬁcant. So increasing unemployment insurance can have a positive impact
on employment and the agents welfare when focusing on the stationary state,
but can also generate dynamic ineﬃciencies due to expectations coordination
failures in the case of local indeterminacy.
The paper is organized as follows. The agents behavior is speciﬁed in
section 2, and analyzed further in more detail in Appendix A. Eﬃciency
wage contracts are studied in section 3 and in appendix B. In section 4, the
equations governing the local dynamics near a stationary state are presented.
We consider there the existence and comparative statics of such a stationary
state, in particular when unemployment insurance increases. Deterministic
local indeterminacy and local bifurcations are analyzed in section 5. Conclu-
sions and a few hints for future research are given in Section 6.
2A g e n t s B e h a v i o r
I describe in this section how eﬃciency wages can be formally intro-
duced in a ﬁnance constrained economy of the Woodford type (1986), with
capital-labour substitution as generalized in Grandmont, Pintus and De
Vilder (GPV, 1998). I focus here on the overlapping generations structure
arising from the inﬁnite horizon version of the model, near the monetary
steady state. I make precise in Appendix A how the complete speciﬁcation
of the inﬁnite horizon model with eﬁciency wages, can be reduced to the
overlapping generations speciﬁcation considered directly here.
The economy involves three types of agents (ﬁrms, ”capitalists” and
”workers”), three commodities (capital, labor and a consumption good) and
6two assets (physical capital and ﬁat money).
There is a continuum of identical small ﬁrms, the total size of which is
normalized to 1. Firms in period t combine physical capital kt−1 = 0 with
eﬃcient labour lt = nt xt = 0, where nt = 0 is the number of labour units
employed and xt = 0 is the eﬀort level (assumed to be the same across
identical workers), to produce output yt = 0 available in the same period
according to a constant return technology given by the production function
yt = AF (kt−1,l t). When l>0, I shall represent this technology by y =
lAf(a), where a = k/l is the capital-eﬃcient labour ratio, Af(a) is the
reduced production function AF(a,1) and A>0 is a scaling productivity
parameter. I shall assume throughout
(2.a) The reduced production function y/l = Af(a) is a continuous func-
tion of the capital-eﬃcient labour ratio a = k/l = 0, with f(0) = 0, and
has continuous derivatives of all required orders for a>0, with f0(a) > 0,
f00(a) < 0. In particular, the marginal productivity of capital, Aρ(a)=
Af0(a), decreases from +∞ to 0, while the marginal productivity of eﬃcient
labour Aω(a)=A(f(a)−af0(a)) increases from 0 to +∞, when the capital-
eﬃcient labour ratio a goes up from 0 to +∞.
Firms’ proﬁt maximizing behavior, as speciﬁed precisely shortly below, will
imply that production takes place in period t so that the capital-eﬃcient
labour ratio at = kt−1/lt equates 1) the real rental rate of capital services
ρt = rt/pt, where rt > 0 is the nominal rental rate and pt > 0 the price
of output, with the marginal productivity of capital Aρ(at), and 2) the real
wage per unit of eﬀort ωt/xt = wt/(ptxt), where wt > 0 is the nominal wage
and xt > 0 the eﬀort level, with the marginal productivity of eﬃcient labour
Aω(at). As capital is assumed to depreciate at the constant rate 0 < δ < 1,
the real gross rate of return on capital Rt = ρt +1−δ, will then be equal to
R(A,at)=Aρ(at)+1− δ.
There is a second continuum of agents, called ”capitalists”, the size of
which is also normalized to 1. They do not work and to simplify matters,
are assumed to have Cobb-Douglas instantaneous utility for consumption,
Log ctc, a n dt oh a v ea ni n ﬁnite horizon, so that at date t they maximize




j Log ct+j,c, where the discount
factor satisﬁes 0 < βc < 1, g i v e nc u r r e n ta n de x p e c t e d( n o nr a n d o m )p r i c e s
of consumption, (pt+j), and real gross rates of return on capital (Rt+j),j=
0. Capitalists can save in the form of cash balances as well as of physical
capital. We assume perfect foresight and shall focus on equilibria such that
7Rt+1 = R =1 /βc > 1=pt/pt+1 at the steady state and thus Rt+1 >p t/pt+1
nearby for all t. Physical capital dominates then money as an asset, so that
capitalists choose to hold capital only, implying budget constraints of the
form ctc + ktc = Rtkt−1,c and an optimal consumption, capital investment
policy given by
ctc =( 1− βc)Rtkt−1,c ,k tc = βcRtkt−1,c. (2.1)
There is ﬁnally a third continuum of identical small agents, called ”work-
ers”, the size of which is also normalized to 1. Each individual worker sup-
plies one unit of labour. Firms’ proﬁt maximizing behavior will result, as
described precisely shortly below, in an ”eﬃciency wage contract” (wt,x t),
that speciﬁes the nominal wage wt > 0 to be paid to an employed worker
provided that he produces the required eﬀort level xt > 0. Firm’s behavior
will generate also a demand nt > 0 of labour units to be employed. We shall
f o c u sh e r eo nu n e m p l o y m e n t ,i . e . o nc o n ﬁgurations where nt < 1. Then it
i sa s s u m e dt h a ta td a t et, nt individual workers are drawn independently at
random and oﬀered employment with the eﬃciency wage contract (wt,x t).
As such a contract is designed to induce workers to make indeed the required
eﬀort level xt, no worker will turn down the job oﬀer : unemployment will
be involuntary.
This formulation implies that there are 1−nt > 0 workers who are unem-
ployed at date t. It is assumed that there is unemployment insurance, so that
unemployed workers get the income νwt = 0, where the rate of compensation
0 5 ν < 1 is fully anticipated by all agents. Unemployment compensation
is funded by taxing wages and unemployed workers income at the uniform
rate 0 5 (1−dt) 5 1, so that the rate dt is obtained in equilibrium from the
employment and wage rates (nt,w t) by
(1 − nt)dtνwt =( 1− dt)ntwt. (2.2)
Workers are assumed to have instantaneous utility for consumption U(ctw),
and disutility for eﬀort, V (xtw).They are assumed also to have an inﬁnite
horizon, so that their objective is to maximize at date t the expectation




j (U (ct+j,w) − βwV (xt+j,w)),
where 0 < βw < 1 is their discount factor, subject to the appropriate budget
constraints, given current and expected (again, non random) prices for con-
sumption, (pt+j), real gross rates of return on capital (Rt+j), employment
rates (nt+j), eﬃciency wage contracts (wt+j,x t+j), and wage income taxation
rates (1 − dt+j). In this framework, the wage contracts do specify the required
8eﬀort levels, so that the (random) sequence xt+j,w is given, since it is equal
to xt+j with probability nt+j (when the worker is employed) and to 0 with
probability 1−nt+j (when he is unemployed). On the other hand, a worker’s
(random) consumption ct+j,w will depend on the history of his employment
status. The speciﬁc feature of the workers’ decision making problem assumed
here as well as in Woodford (1986) or GPV (1998), is that they are subject
to a ﬁnance constraint stating that their money demand mt+j,w = 0 in period
t + j cannot be less than their disposable money wage income dt+jwt+j (if
employed) or their disposable money unemployment compensation dt+jνwt+j
(if unemployed) at that date (for instance, they will receive this income in
cash at the end of the period, but cannot borrow against it). Such a ﬁnance
constraint is necessarily binding at a monetary steady state (there is no point
in keeping a constant positive amount of idle cash in excess of the station-
a r yd i s p o s a b l ew a g ei n c o m eo ru n e m p l o y m e n tc o m p e n s a t i o n )a n dt h e r e f o r e
nearby. On the other hand, we shall focus on intertemporal equilibria with
perfect foresight that satisfy at a steady state and thus nearby (assuming




This inequality states that the marginal cost, in terms of the utility of fore-
gone consumption, of investing in one additional unit of physical capital,
exceeds the corresponding expected utility gain. It implies that thanks to
the ﬁnance constraint, workers will keep their wage income or unemployment
compensation in cash, but will choose not to make any additional saving in
physical capital even though this asset dominates money.
A worker’s behavior exhibits therefore a simple two-periods overlapping
generations structure, since he will keep at date t his disposable wage income
dtwt (when employed, with probability nt) or his after-tax unemployment
compensation dtνwt (when unemployed, with probability 1−nt) in the form
of a money balance mtw or mu
tw when ”young”, and will spend it one period
later, when ”old”, to ﬁnance consumption ct+1,w or cu
t+1,w at the price pt+1 :
dtwt = mtw = pt+1ct+1,w if employed at t,with probability nt,
dtνwt = mu
tw = pt+1cu
t+1,w if unemployed at t,with probability 1 − nt. (2.4)
We see accordingly that (2.3) will obtain at a deterministic stationary state
and nearby, since one will have Rt+1 = R =1 /βc > 1 at such a steady state,
when the workers’ discount factor βw is signiﬁcantly lower than βc, i.e. when
workers are signiﬁcantly more impatient than capitalists (this condition is
9similar to that of Woodford (1986) or GPV (1998) in the case of a competitive
labor market), when the workers’ consumption does not vary much with their
employment status (when unemployment insurance is signiﬁcant, ν is close
to 1), and when the workers’ utility for consumption U(c) displays low risk
aversion (marginal utility U0(c) does not decrease too fast).
It remains to specify how ﬁrms determine at date t their production plans
(yt,k t−1,l t = ntxt) and the eﬃciency wage contract (wt,x t) that they oﬀer to
workers, given the price pt > 0 of output, the rental rate rt > 0 of capital
services, the rate of unemployment insurance ν and the rate of taxation




lt − ρtkt−1, (2.5)
where ωt = wt/pt is the real wage and ρt = rt/pt is the real rental rate of
capital services. Given ρt and the real wage per unit of eﬀort ωt/xt, proﬁt
maximization in (2.5) with respect to (kt−1,l t) leads to a capital - eﬃcient
labour ratio at = kt−1/lt that equates, as announced earlier, ρt with the
marginal productivity of capital, and ωt/xt with the marginal productivity
of eﬃcient labour
ρt = Aρ(at) and ωt/xt = Aω(at). (2.6)
Proﬁt maximization makes on the other hand ﬁrms seek to minimize the
real cost of labor per unit of eﬀort ωt/xt. I follow here the fundamental in-
sight provided by Negishi (1979, Ch. 9), Solow (1979), who noted that ﬁrms
are constrained in their choice of a wage contract by the fact that workers’
productivity (here their incentives to provide a required eﬀort level) depends
positively on the wage oﬀered in the contract. I adopt here a speciﬁcation
that is directly inspired from the ”shirking” formulation of Coimbra (1999),
Alexopoulos (2004), Nakajima (2006), Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2006), follow-
ing the early contribution of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), see also Danthine
and Donaldson (1990), Uhlig and Xu (1996). At date t, under our maintained
assumption (2.3), an employed worker under the wage contract (wt,x t) who
provides the required eﬀort level xtw = xt, gets the money wage wt, keeps the
corresponding disposable wage income in cash, mtw = dtwt, in order to ﬁ-
nance his consumption one period later, ct+1,w = dtωtpt/pt+1, as in (2.4), the
corresponding utility level achieved being U(dtωtpt/pt+1) − V (xt). Aw o r k e r
employed under the same contract (wt,x t) who ”shirks”, i.e. who provides no
eﬀort, xtw =0 , faces a probability 0 < θ < 1 of getting caught. In that case,
he is ﬁred, gets the unemployment compensation νwt, keeps the after-tax
10income dtνwt = mu
tw in cash in order to ﬁnance his consumption one period
later cu
t+1,w = dtνωtpt/pt+1 = νct+1,w. The ”Non-Shirking Condition” (NSC)
stipulates that the wage rate wt, the eﬀort level xt and penalties for shirking
should be such that
(NSC) The disutility of eﬀort is outweighted by the expected utility gain
of not shirking
V (xt) − V (0) 5 θ[U(ct+1,w) − U(νct+1,w)]
where ct+1,w = dtωtpt/pt+1 . (2.7)
Firms’ proﬁt maximizing behavior will make them accordingly to choose a
production plan (yt,k t−1,l t = ntxt) satisﬁying the standard marginal produc-
tivity conditions (2.6), and oﬀer a wage contract (wt,x t) that minimizes the
real cost of labour per unit of eﬀort, ωt/xt, subject to the non-shirking con-
ditions (NSC) (2.7). We note that this condition ensures that an employed
non-shirking worker is at least as well oﬀ as when employed but shirking,
and thus strictly better oﬀ than if he were unemployed. Hence unemploy-
ment is involuntary. We analyze in the next section the characteristics of the
resulting optimum eﬃciency wage contract.
3E ﬃciency wage contracts
Minimizing the real cost of labour per unit of eﬀort ωt/xt, given dt,p t/pt+1,
amounts to minimizing consumption ct+1,w = dtωtpt/pt+1 per unit of eﬀort.
It follows that eﬃciency wage contracting will generate an eﬀort level x∗
and a non-shirking employed worker consumption c∗ that is constant over
time and that maximizes eﬀort per unit of consumption x/c subject to the
non-shirking schedule
(NSS) V (x) − V (0) = θ[U(c) − U (νc)]
def
≡ ϕ(c,ν). (3.1)
We shall assume throughout :
(3.a) Disutility of eﬀort satisﬁes V (0) = 0,V(x) > 0 for 0 <x<x where
x is the maximum eﬀort level (possibly inﬁnite). There is a ﬁxed cost of
providing eﬀort, 0 <x o = lim
x→0V (x). Disutility of eﬀort V (x) is continuously
diﬀerentiable of every required order for 0 <x<x, increasing (V 0(x) > 0),
strictly convex (V 00(x) > 0) with lim
x→x V 0(x)=+ ∞.
11(3.b) Utility of consumption U(c) is continuous for c = 0, continuously
diﬀerentiable of every required order for c>0, increasing (U0(c) > 0) and
strictly concave (U00(c) < 0). Moreover, cU0(c) is increasing for c>0




We note that when cU0(c) is increasing, the function ϕ(c,ν) appearing in
the NSS (3.1) is increasing in c, since cϕ0
c(c,ν)=θ[cU0(c) − νcU0(νc)] > 0.
If we assume in addition
(3.c) 0=ϕ(0,ν) <x o = lim
x→0V (x) < lim
c→∞ϕ(c,ν) 5 lim
x→xV (x),
we may conclude since V (0) = 0
Lemma 3.1. Under assumptions (3.a), (3.b), (3.c), the Non-Shirking
Schedule (NSS) (3.1) determines uniquely eﬀort x as a function of consump-
tion x = h(c,ν) by h(0,ν)=0when c =0 , and by h(c,ν)
def
≡ V −1 (ϕ(c,ν))
for c>c o where co > 0 is given by xo = ϕ(co,ν).
Under the above assumptions, an optimum eﬃciency wage contract is
c h a r a c t e r i z e db ya ne m p l o y e dw o r k e rc o n s u m p t i o nc∗ >c o and eﬀort level
x∗ = h(c∗,ν) that maximizes eﬀort per unit of consumption x/c = h(c,ν)/c.
We may expect existence and unicity of such a maximum when h(c,ν) is
strictly concave in consumption for c>c o ( F i g .1 .N o t et h ei m p o r t a n c eo f
a ﬁxed disutility cost of eﬀort xo > 0 to ensure c∗ >c o > 0 and x∗ > 0).
Since V (x) is strictly convex, this property will be guaranteed if the function















t h i sw i l lb et h ec a s ei fw ea s s u m eo nt o po f( 3 . b)
(3.d) −c2U00(c) is increasing (−cU000(c)/U00(c) < 2).
In the case of a constant elasticity speciﬁcation, U(c)=cη, assumptions (3.b)
and (3.d)a r es a t i s ﬁed whenever η < 1.
Fig. 1
12Proposition 3.2. Under assumptions (3.a), (3.b), (3.c), (3.d), there is a
unique worker’s eﬀort level x∗ > 0 and consumption c∗ >c o that maximizes
eﬀort per unit of consumption x/c under the Non-Shirking Schedule (NSS)
V (x)=θ[U(c) − U(νc)] ≡ ϕ(c,ν).









The (simple) proof of this fact is given in appendix B. Intuitively, one
should expect that the maximum eﬀort per unit of consumption x∗/c∗ in-
volved in the optimum eﬃciency wage contract, goes down when the unem-
ployment compensation rate 0 5 ν < 1 goes up, since ﬁrms have to pay
higher wages, other things being equal, in order to compensate the greater
incentive for workers to shirk. Formally, the function ϕ(c,ν) appearing in
the NSS decreases, so that the graph of x = h(c,ν) i nF i g . 1s h i f t st ot h e
right, making the optimum ratio x∗/c∗ to go down. It can be veriﬁed that
the workers consumption c∗ then actually increases, while the consequence
on the eﬀort level x∗ is ambiguous.
Corollary 3.3. Under assumptions (3.a), (3.b), (3.c),( 3 . d ) ,i n c r e a s i n g
the rate 0 5 ν < 1 of unemployment insurance makes the eﬀort per unit of
consumption x∗/c∗ of the optimum eﬃciency wage contract to go down, the
corresponding consumption c∗ to increase, whereas the variation of the eﬀort
level x∗ is ambiguous.
The analytical proof of this fact may be found in Appendix B. Explicit cal-
culations that can be veriﬁed by direct inspection, show that in the case of a
constant elasticity speciﬁcation, the eﬀort level x∗ involved in the optimum
eﬃciency wage contract is actually constant, while the corresponding con-
sumption c∗ increases and goes up to inﬁnity when 0 5 ν < 1 increases and
tends to 1.
Corollary 3.4 Let V (x)=xo + xξ for 0 <x<+∞, and U(c)=cη for
c>0, with 0 < η < 1 < ξ (Assumptions (3.a), (3.b), (3.c), (3.d)).
The Non-Shirking Schedule (NSS) is given by
x = h(c,ν)=( θ(1 − ν
η)c
η − xo)
1/ξ for c>c o =[ xo/(θ(1 − ν
η))]
1/η .
The maximum of eﬀort per unit of consumption x/c in the optimum eﬃciency
wage contract is obtained for c∗ = co(ξ/(ξ − η))1/η >c o and stipulates the
eﬀort level x∗ =( xoη/(ξ − η))1/ξ.
13W h e nt h er a t eo fu n e m p l o y m e n ti n s u r a n c e0 5 ν < 1 goes up and tends to
1, the optimum eﬀort level x∗ stays constant while the worker’s consumption
c∗ increases and goes to +∞.
4 Perfect foresight intertemporal unemploy-
ment equilibria
We analyze in this section deterministic intertemporal equilibria with
perfect foresight, under the maintained hypothesis :
(4.a) Assumptions (2.a) on ﬁrms, and (3.a), (3.b),(3.c), (3.d) on workers,
hold.
We keep on focusing on equilibria statisfying Rt >p t/pt+1 and (2.3) for all
t = 0, so that capitalists save only in the form of capital, ktc > 0, while
workers hold cash only. Equilibrium at date t on the market for capital
services kt−1 and for the amount of newly invested capital stock kt, together
with capitalists’ saving behavior, kt = βcRtkt−1 with Rt = ρt +1− δ, and
ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization (2.6), yields
kt = βcR(A,at)kt−1, with R(A,at)=aρ(at)+1− δ. (4.1)
Under the maintained assumption of involuntary unemployment, i.e. nt <
1 for all t = 0, equilibrium on the labour maket is achieved through proﬁt
maximizing eﬃciency wage contracting and rationing of the labour supply
down to the ﬁrms’ labour demand nt. The eﬃciency wage oﬀered by ﬁrms
determines xt = x∗ > 0 and ct+1,w = c∗ > 0 for a worker employed at t,
for all t = 0. Given the initial capital stock kt−1 > 0, determination of the
capital-eﬃcient labour ratio at = kt−1/(ntx∗) at date t is then equivalent to
the determination of the real rental rate of capital services ρt = Aρ(at), or
of the real wage per unit of eﬀort ωt/x∗ = Aω(at), as well as of the current
employment rate nt.
We consider ﬁnally the equilibrium of the money market at date t +1
(which will imply, by Walras law, equilibrium of the remaining market for
output). We assume that the money supply is constant and equal to M>0
for all t. At the beginning of period t +1 , the whole money stock M is held
by workers, who got it at date t either as wage income if they were employed,
or as unemployment compensation otherwise. Thanks to the binding ﬁnance
constraint, workers spend their money balances in period t+1to ﬁnance their
consumption, either c∗ if previously employed at t,o rνc∗ if not. This implies
14M/pt+1 = ntc∗ +(1−nt)νc∗. On the other hand, the whole money stock will
e n du pa tt +1in the pocket of workers as well, in the form of wage income
for workers who are employed then, or of unemployment compensation for
those who are not. Since unemployment insurance is entirely ﬁnanced out
of wages (see (2.2)), this means that M/pt+1 = nt+1ωt+1, where nt+1 < 1 is
employment and ωt+1 is the real wage at date t +1 .
As the real wage per unit of eﬀort at t +1is also given by ωt+1/x∗ =
Aω(at+1) and nt+1x∗ = lt+1 = kt/at+1, we get






which determines implicitly, given kt−1 > 0 and at > 0, and thus the new
equilibrium capital stock kt > 0 through (4.1), the equilibrium capital-
eﬃcient labour ratio at+1 = kt/lt+1 > 0 at t +1 .
Deﬁnition 4.1. A perfect foresight intertemporal unemployment equilib-
rium is a sequence of capital stocks kt−1 > 0 and of capital-eﬃcient labour
ratios at = kt−1/lt > 0 with nt = kt−1/(atx∗) < 1 for all t = 0, such that
kt = βcR(A,at)kt−1,where R(A,at)= Aρ(at)+1− δ,
ktAω(at+1)/at+1 = g(kt−1/at), where g(l)= l c∗
x∗ +( 1− l
x∗)νc∗
A distinctive feature of the above two-dimensional deterministic dynam-
ics is that its structure is in fact identical to the dynamics that would arise
in the competitive speciﬁcation with elastic labour supply l>0 analyzed in
Woodford (1986) or GPV (1998). The only but essential diﬀerence is that
the function g(l) appearing here, that stands for aggregate consumption of
employed and unemployed workers as a function of employment of eﬃcient
labour l = nx∗ <x ∗, would be replaced there by the workers’ oﬀer curve
γ(l), i.e. their aggregate consumption as a function of their labour supply
l>0 resulting from their utility maximizing consumption-leisure choice un-
der competitive conditions. We shall exploit this feature systematically in
the next section, to show that it is much likely to generate deterministic
local indeterminacy and bifurcations, in particular when the unemployment
insurance rate ν < 1 is large. We focus here on existence and unicity of a
deterministic stationary solution kt = k>0,a t = a>0 for all t, of the
dynamical system in Deﬁnition 4.1, and how it varies, as well as the agents
welfare, when unemployment insurance increases.
Such a stationary state is characterized by βcR(A,a)=1 , which deter-
mines uniquely a>0, given the technology, thus A, since under assump-
tion (2.a), βcR(A,a) decreases from +∞ to βc (1 − δ) < 1 when a goes up
15from 0 to +∞. Given this a, the stationary capital stock k>0 or equiva-
lently employment n = k/(ax∗), is determined by nAω(a)=g(nx∗)/x∗ =
n(c∗/x∗)+( 1− n)ν (c∗/x∗). T h el e f th a n ds i d ec a nb ei n t e r p r e t e da st h e
workers’ stationary real demand for money, since it is equal to the real wage
bill, per unit of eﬀort. Given a>0, it increases linearly, when stationary
employment n varies between 0 and 1, from 0 to Aω(a). The right hand
side stands for the workers’ stationary real supply of money when buying
consumption, again per unit of eﬀort. It increases also linearly, from νc∗/x∗
to c∗/x∗, when n varies from 0 to full employment. The intersection of these
”demand and supply” schedules determines a unique stationary employment
0 < n<1 if and only if there is unemployment insurance, ν > 0, and the
technology is productive enough, i.e. when the marginal productivity of one
additional unit of labor who provides the eﬀort level x∗,Ax ∗ω(a), covers the
extra consumption c∗ needed to induce workers not to shirk (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2
We look next at the consequence on stationary employment n of increasing
unemployment insurance 0 < ν < 1. One might expect such a policy to be
detrimental to employment since by reducing workers’ incentives not to shirk,
it should lead, other things being equal, to a higher real cost of labour per unit
of eﬀort ωt/xt to be paid by ﬁrms through eﬃciency wage contracts. It turns
out that the conclusion has to be in fact reversed when general equilibrium
eﬀects, as a consequence of increasing workers’ consumption, are taken into
account. The stationary capital-eﬃcient labour ratio, solving βcR(A,a)=1 ,
and thus the real ”demand” schedule nAω(a) in Fig 2, is independent of ν.
On the other hand, we know from Corollary 3.3 that increasing the rate of
unemployment insurance makes consumption per unit of eﬀort c∗/x∗ to go
up, so that the real ”supply” schedule n(c∗/x∗)+(1− n)ν (c∗/x∗) is pushed
up on two counts in Fig. 2 : directly through the increase of ν and indirectly
through the induced increase of c∗/x∗. All this makes stationary employment
to go up.
The ultimate consequences of increasing unemployment insurance on the
agents’ welfare are nevertheless ambiguous since we know that in the general
case, the corresponding variation of the eﬀort level x∗ is ambiguous (Corol-
lary 3.3). Sharp conclusions can be obtained in the case of the constant
elasticity speciﬁcation considered in Corollary 3.4, since the eﬀort level x∗ is
then unchanged. Increasing stationary employment n as a result of greater
unemployment insurance raises the stationary capital stock k = anx∗ and
16generates actually a Pareto welfare improvement along the stationary state
for all agents.
Proposition 4.2. Under the maintained assumption (4.a) :
1. A deterministic stationary state, i.e. a stationary solution k = k>
0,a t = a>0 of the dynamical system in Deﬁnition 4.1, is characterized by
au n i q u ec a p i t a l - e ﬃcient labour ratio that solves βcR (A,a)=1 . It involves
a rate of employment n = k/(ax∗) given by
n =
νc∗/x∗
Aω(a)+ν (c∗/x∗ ) − (c∗/x∗ )
that is positive whenever there is unemployment insurance, ν > 0, and cor-
responds to unemployment, n<1, if and only if the technology is productive
enough, Ax∗ω(a) >c ∗.
2 . I n c r e a s i n gt h er a t eo fu n e m p l o y m e n ti n s u r a n c e0 < ν < 1, other
things being equal, makes the stationary rate of employment n to go up. In
the constant elasticity speciﬁcation considered in Corollary 3.4, it leads to
a Pareto welfare improvement, as it increases the discounted intertemporal
utility of capitalists along the stationary state (k goes up), as well as the
expectation of the workers’ discounted intertemporal utility, whether they are
initially employed or unemployed (c∗ goes up, x∗ is unchanged, ν increases
and the probability of employment n is larger) as long as c∗ <A x ∗ω(a).
Our whole analysis rests upon the assumption that there is excess supply
on the labour market, nt < 1 for all t = 0. If we ﬁx the technology, in
particular the productivity parameter A and thus a, and increase the rate
of unemployment insurance toward 1, it may be that the employed workers
stationary consumption per unit of eﬀort c∗/x∗ increases above Aω(a) (as in
the constant elasticity speciﬁcation) so that the stationary value of n found in
1) of Proposition 4.2 exceeds 1. In such a case, there would be excess demand
for labor, the equilibrium on that market being achieved through rationing
of the ﬁrms’ labor demand, in the spirit of traditional disequilibrium analysis
(Barro and Grossman (1976), Benassy (1982, 2002), Drèze (1991), Malinvaud
(1977)). We focus here on unemployment conﬁgurations only.
Remark 4.3. One veriﬁes easily that along a stationary state, the real
gross rate of return on capital is R =1 /βc > 1=pt/pt+1, so indeed Rt >
pt/pt+1 for all intertemporal equilibria in a small enough neighborhood of
the stationary state. Capitalists hold only capital and no money along such
equilibria, as indeed postulated in the text. On the other hand, along a
stationary state, inequalities (2.3) will read in any period t :
171) U0(c∗) > (βw/βc)U0(c∗) ( w h e ne m p l o y e da td a t e st − 1 and t),
2) U0(νc∗) > (βw/βc)U0(c∗) ( w h e nu n e m p l o y e da tt − 1 and employed at t),
3) U0(νc∗) > (βw/βc)U0(νc∗) ( w h e nu n e m p l o y e di nb o t hp e r i o d s )a n d
4) U0(c∗) > (βw/βc)U0(νc∗) ( w h e ne m p l o y e da tt − 1 and unemployed at t).
The ﬁrst three inequalities are satisﬁed when βc > βw. The fourth one re-
quires that βc is signiﬁcantly larger than βw, that the rate of unemployment
insurance ν is close enough to 1, and that the workers’ utility for consump-
tion U(c) displays low risk aversion (marginal utility U0(c) does not decrease
too fast). In that case, inequalities (2.3) will also hold along intertemporal
equilibria within a small enough neighborhood of the stationary state, so
that workers hold cash only and no capital, as indeed postulated in the text.
In the constant elasticity speciﬁcation, U(c)=cη, inequalities 1) to 4) hold
whenever ν > (βw/βc)
1/(1−η) .
5 Deterministic local indeterminacy and bi-
furcations
We study in this section the deterministic local dynamics (kt−1,a t) →
(kt,a t+1) near the stationary state, as deﬁned implicitly in Deﬁnition 4.1, in
relation with the elasticities of the various functions involved there, in partic-
ular with the share s = aρ(a)/f (a) of capital in total income, the elasticity
of substitution σ between capital and eﬃcient labour, and the elasticity of
g(l)=c∗ [(l/x∗)+ν (1 − (l/x∗))] giving the workers aggregate consumption





. As mentioned earlier, our analysis will be greatly simpliﬁed by
the fact that the dynamics in the case of a competitive labour market and
an elastic labour supply, as studied in GPV (1998), is actually the same as
in Deﬁnition 4.1, with the function g(l) being replaced there by the workers’
competitive oﬀer curve c = γ (l).











of the competitive oﬀer














ν +( 1− ν)n
. (5.1)
The essential characteristic of the competitive speciﬁcation in GPV (1998) is
that εγ > 1, because the workers’ competitive labour supply, deﬁned implic-
itly as a function of the real wage ω by ωl = γ(l), has an elasticity equal to
181/[εγ (l) − 1] that is assumed to be positive. The consequence of this fact in
the competitive case is that local indeterminacy and bifurcations can occur
only for very low capital-labour elasticities of substitution, σ <s ,too low to




in (5.1) is clearly
less than 1 and can be actually quite small when unemployment insurance ν
is large (close to 1). As will be made precise shortly, this feature will reverse
drastically the qualitative conclusions, in the sense that in the eﬃciency wage
case, local determinacy will always occur for σ <s ,while local indeterminacy
will be observed for larger and quite plausible values of σ and ν close enough
to 1.
The approach just outlined rests on the possibility to make the rate ν of





small. This may lead to problematic self-contradictory conﬁgurations
if we ﬁx completely the technology while doing so, since in such cases the
stationary value of n in Proposition 4.2 may involve ”overemployment”, n>
1. In order to avoid such conﬁgurations here, we shall employ a simple trick,
namely to ﬁx all fundamental characteristics of the economy, including ﬁrms’
technology, except the productivity parameter A>0, that will be in fact
systematically ”scaled” so as to guarantee that stationary employment will
be ”normalized” to a pre-speciﬁed value 0 < n<1. That such a scaling
procedure is indeed feasible is easily seen by remarking that the ﬁrst equation




, i.e. βcR(A,a)=1 , deﬁnes implicitly
a as a function α(A) that is increasing from 0 to +∞ as the productivity
parameter A varies from 0 to +∞. So given the pre-speciﬁed ”normalized”
value of employment n, the second equation characterizing the stationary
state, i.e. nAω(α(A)) = n(c∗/x∗)+( 1− n)ν (c∗/x∗), leads to a unique
solution for the scaling productivity parameter A, thanks to assumption (2.a)
on ﬁrms, however close to 1 is the rate ν of unemployment insurance, and
correlatively, however large is the employed workers’ consumption per unit
of eﬀort c∗/x∗ involved in the induced eﬃciency wage contract. We shall
assume accordingly form now on :





, solution of βcR(A,a)=1and nAω(a)=
n(c∗/x∗)+( 1− n)ν (c∗/x∗), with k = nx∗a, is assumed to be normalized to
ap r e - s p e c i ﬁed value 0 < n<1, through an appropriate choice of the produc-
tivity parameter A.
The local dynamics near such a normalized stationary state is well de-
ﬁned, thanks to the implicit function theorem, as long as we assume εω =
aω0 (a)/ω(a) 6=1 .
19Proposition 5.1. Let assumption (5.a) hold. Let εω = aω0 (a)/ω(a)=
s/σ be the elasticity of the marginal productivity of eﬃcient labour, | εR |=
| aR0 (a)/R(a) |= δ
∗(1−s)/σ be the elasticity of the real gross rate of return







=( 1− ν)n/[ν +( 1− ν)n] be the elasticity
of the workers’ aggregate consumption as a function of employment l = nx∗,
all evaluated at the normalized stationary state, where s = aρ(a)/f (a) is
the share of capital in total income, σ is the elasticity of substitution between
capital and eﬃcient labour, and δ
∗ =1−βc (1 − δ) is assumed to be positive.
Assume εω 6=1or σ 6= s. Then Deﬁnition 4.1 deﬁnes uniquely a lo-
cal dynamics (kt−1,a t) → (kt−1,a t+1) near the normalized stationary state ¡
k,a
¢
. The linearized dynamics for the deviations dk = k−k,da = a−a are
determined by






εg− | εR |
εω − 1
dat .
The sum T and product D of the two eigenvalues solutions of the correspond-
ing characteristic polynomial Q(z) ≡ z2 − Tz+ D =0are given by
T = T1 − (εg − 1)σ/(s − σ) ,D = εgD1
where T1 =1+D1 and D1 =( δ
∗ (1 − s) − σ)/(s − σ).
Proof : This is Proposition 4.1 together with (2.9) and (2.10) in GPV (1998),
with εg replacing here εγ there, and δ
∗ here instead of the rate δ of capital
depreciation there, on account of the fact that the capitalists’ discount fac-
tor βc w a sa s s u m e dt ob ee q u a lt o1i nG P V( 1 9 9 8 )w h e r e a sβc < 1 here.
Q.E.D.
We employ the same geometrical method as in GPV (1998), that allows
to evaluate local stability and bifurcations of the two eigenvalues of the local
linearized dynamics without actually computing them explicitly, by locating
their sum and product in the (T, D) plane and by looking at how T and D
move as a function of a few key economic parameters.
I nt h e( T ,D )p l a n e ,t h el i n e( A C )o fe q u a t i o nD = T − 1 is the locus
where one eigenvalue of the local dynamics is equal to +1. The line (AB)
of equation D = −T − 1 corresponds to one eigenvalue equal to −1.O n
the segment [BC] of equation D =1 , | T |5 2, the two local eigenvalues are
complex conjugates with modulus 1 (Fig. 3). Since the two eigenvalues are
stable when T =0 ,D =0 , one gets by continuity two stable eigenvalues,
hence local indeterminacy in the framework considered here with one single
20predetermined variable kt−1, in the interior of the triangle ABC. Saddle point
determinacy obtains in the two regions between the two lines (AB) and (AC)
determined by | T |>| 1+D | . The stationary state is a source, hence locally
determinate in the regions between the two lines (AB) and (AC) above the
segment [BC], and below the point A. When considering a one dimensional
family of economies with varying characteristics so that (T, D) moves along
a curve in the plane, crossing the line (AC) leads generically to a so-called
transcritical bifurcation (since we have here a persistent stationary state).
Crossing the line (AB) leads generically to a Flip bifurcation involving a
cycle of period 2 near the stationary state, whereas crossing the interior of the
segment [BC] leads generically to a Hopf bifurcation involving an invariant
closed curve near the stationary state.
In what follows, we shall ﬁx the capitalists and workers characteristics,
the ”normalized” stationary employment rate 0 < n<1 and all characteris-
tics of the technology except the productivity parameter A, that is assumed
to adjust as in assumption (5.a). We shall conduct the analysis as if the
three parameters σ,s = aρ(a)/f(a) and εg appearing in Proposition 5.1
can be made to vary independently. One should keep in mind nevertheless
when applying our results that, strictly speaking, when εg is made to move
through for instance a variation of the rate of unemployment insurance ν,
”normalized” stationary employment n being ﬁx e da si na s s u m p t i o n( 5 . a),
the stationary capital-eﬃcient labour ratio a, hence the share s of capital
in total income, is bound to move as well (except in the speciﬁcc a s eo fa
Cobb-Douglas production function).
The key observation is here as in GPV (1998, Section 2), that T and
D appearing in Proposition 5.1 vary linearly with εg, when s,σ (and δ
∗)
are kept ﬁx e d .T h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gp o i n t( T ,D )i nt h ep l a n em o v e sa c c o r d -
ingly then along a straight line ∆(σ) going through the point M1 (σ)=
(T1 (σ),D 1 (σ)) for εg =1that belongs to the line (AC) since T1 (σ)=
1+D1 (σ) with D1 (σ)=( δ
∗ (1 − s) − σ)/(s − σ), and having a slope equal
to 1−(δ
∗ (1 − s)/σ). T h ep a r to f∆(σ) that was relevant in the competitive
case studied in GPV (1998) was the half −subline corresponding to εg > 1
(see the dashed half-lines in Fig. 3, 4, 5). In the eﬃciency wage speciﬁcation
considered here, on has 0 < εg < 1 (see (5.1)), so the relevant portion is the
segment (drawn in plain in Fig. 3, 4, 5) generated by varying εg or ν between
0 and 1 and joining the point M1 (σ) on (AC) (for εg =1or ν =0 )to the
point M0 (σ)=( T0 (σ),0) on the horizontal axis D =0(corresponding to
εg =0or ν =1 )with T0 (σ)=1+δ
∗(1−s)/(s−σ). The qualitative picture
one gets then (Fig.3) makes clear right at the begining that local indeter-
21minacy (i.e. intersection with the stability triangle ABC) cannot occur for
the same range of elasticities σ in the competitive case of GPV (1998) and
the eﬃciency wage model considered here, since for any σ, the half −subline
of ∆(σ) corresponding to εg > 1 and the segment [M0 (σ),M 1 (σ)] stand on
opposite sides of (AC).
Fig. 3
––—
How the segment [M0 (σ),M 1 (σ)] varies with σ b e c o m e si nf a c tas i m p l e
consequence of the analysis made in GPV (1998, Section 2). We focus here as
well on the case where δ
∗(1−s)/s < 1( δ
∗ =1−βc(1−δ) is bound to be quite
small since the period is short). When σ =0 , the line ∆(σ) crosses (AC)
at a point below C with a positive ordinate (0 <D 1(0) = δ
∗(1 − s)/s < 1),
and is vertical (its slope is −∞). When σ increases toward s, the point
M1 (σ) move down (AC) toward inﬁnity, with D1(σ) going through 0 for
σ = δ
∗(1 − s). The slope of ∆(σ) increases when σ goes up from 0 to s,
from −∞ to 1 − δ
∗(1 − s)/s < 1 (it goes through 0 also for σ = δ
∗(1 − s)).
The outcome in the competitive case is that when σ <s ,since the half
−subline of ∆(σ) for εg > 1 stands above (AC) and intersects the stability
triangle ABC only when σ < σI where σI =[ δ
∗(1 − s)+s]/2 <ssolves
D1(σI)=−1, local indeterminacy and bifurcations occur then only for very
low elasticities of substitution σ between capital and eﬃcient labour (see the
dashed lines in Fig. 4). Still when σ <s ,the diagnosis is reversed as expected
in the eﬃciency wage speciﬁcation considered here, since for 0 < εg < 1, the
relevant segment [M0 (σ),M 1 (σ)] stands below (AC) and never intersects
the stability triangle (Fig. 4) : the stationary state is then a saddlepoint,
hence locally determinate, and no bifurcations occur.
Fig. 4 : The case σ <s
––––––––––—
When σ >sincreases toward +∞, the point M1 (σ) goes down along (AC)
from inﬁnity to the point C, while the slope of ∆(σ) goes up from 1−δ
∗(1−
s)/s to 1. The half −subline corresponding to εg > 1, for the competitive
case, stands now below (AC) (see the dashed lines in Fig. 5). So when σ >s ,
in the competitive case, the stationary state is always a saddle, hence locally
determinate for any εg > 1. Again, the diagnosis is quite the opposite in the
22eﬃciency wage speciﬁcation considered here. When σ >sand 0 < εg < 1,
the relevant segment [M0 (σ),M 1 (σ)] stands above (AC), with M1 (σ) going
a l o n g( A C )d o w nt oC ,w h i l eM0 (σ) is moving form −∞ on the horizontal
axis toward the point (1, 0) on (AC), when σ goes up from s to +∞. So
when s<σ < σH, where σH is determined by the property that ∆(σH)
goes through B =( −2,1), the segment [M0 (σ),M 1 (σ)] never intersects the
stability triangle ABC, so that the stationary state is always determinate (a
source or a saddle) with a possible Flip bifurcation involving a cycle of period
2a sεg goes through εgF when the segment intersects (AB) (see Fig. 5). When
σH < σ < σ−1, where σ−1 is deﬁned by the property that T0(σ−1)=−1,
the segment [M0 (σ),M 1 (σ)] does intersect the stability triangle ABC, so
that the stationary state is locally indeterminate for the intermediate range
of elasticities εgF < εg < εgH, with the stationary state becoming a source
through a Hopf bifurcation when εg goes up through εgH (when the segment
crosses [BC]), or a saddle through a Flip bifurcation when εg goes down
εgF (when the segment intersects (AB)). For higher values σ−1 < σ, the
bifurcation value εgF becomes negative, so that local indeterminacy occurs
for the whole range 0 < εg < εgH. For a graphical illustration of these facts,
see Fig. 5.
Fig. 5 : The case s<σ
––––––––––—
Proposition 5.2. Under the assumptions and notations of Proposi-
tion 5.1, let us assume δ
∗(1 − s)/s < 1.
1) 0 < σ <s .The stationary state is a saddle (locally determinate) for
any 0 < εg < 1.
















ary state is a saddle (locally determinate) for 0 < εg < εgF =1−2[2σ −s−
δ
∗(1 − s)]/[2σ − δ
∗(1 − s)] < 1, as o u r c ew h e nεgF < εg. A Flip bifurcation
occurs generically when εg goes up through εgF.
3) σH < σ < σ−1 = s + δ
∗(1 − s)/2. The stationary state is a saddle
(locally determinate) for 0 < εg < εgF, as i n k( l o c a l l yi n d e t e r m i n a t e )f o r
εgF < εg < εgH =( σ − s)/(σ − δ
∗(1 − s)), a source (locally determinate)
for εgH < εg < 1. G e n e r i c a l l y ,aF l i pb i f u r c a t i o no c c u r sw h e nεg goes down
through εgF, a Hopf bifurcation when εg goes up through εgH.
234) σ−1 < σ. The stationary state is a sink (locally indeterminate) for
0 < εg < εgH, a source (locally determinate) for εgH < εg < 1. Generically,
a Hopf bifurcation occurs when εg goes up through εgH.
Proof : This formal statement is adapted from Proposition 2.2 in GPV (1998)
in view of the preceding discussion and Fig. 4, 5, with εg and δ
∗ replacing
εγ and δ there. The expressions of εgF and εgH above are identical to the
critical values γF and γH given in GPV, again up to (εγ,δ) → (εg,δ
∗).
The expression of σH above is obtained from the condition that ∆(σH) goes
through B =( −2,1), which leads to a second degree equation, and by picking
up the solution σH >s(whereas GPV focused on the other solution σH <
s). Q.E.D.
One may remark ﬁnally that the above critical values σ−1 and εgH deter-
mining the range of local indeterminacy, are compatible with quite plausible
estimations of the corresponding elasticities. In particular, if we focus on
the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function with a share of capital in
total income of about s =1 /3, then σ =1is bound to exceed undoubtedly
σ−1 = s + δ
∗ (1 − s)/2 (or even σ0 = s + δ
∗(1 − s) for which M0 (σ0) co-
incides with the origin (0,0), see Fig. 5), because δ
∗ =1− βc(1 − δ) must
be very small since the period is quite short, to be compatible with the liq-
uidity constraint that workers face. Then for σ =1 , the critical value εgH
is bound to be slightly larger but quite close to 1 − s w 2/3. If we focus on
a ”normalized” rate of employment n =0 .9 to ﬁx ideas, the corresponding
threshold value for the rate of unemployment insurance derived from (5.1),
νH = n(1 − εgH)/[εgH + n(1 − εgH)] is slightly below but quite close to 0.31.
In such a case, when the technology is Cobb-Douglas, σ =1 , local indetermi-
nacy is occurring in the eﬃciency wage model considered here for a wide and
quite plausible range of unemployment insurance rates ν > νH w 0.31. Our
analysis shows that such a result is robust to moderate changes of the eco-
nomic parameters σ,δ
∗,n, etc.... Such a conclusion is to be contrasted with
the outcome obtained in the competitive case, as in GPV (1998), where local
indeterminacy could occur only for implausibly low elasticities σ < σI <s .
6C o n c l u s i o n
We showed in this paper that introducing unemployment through ef-
ﬁciency wage contracts àl aNegishi-Solow, and unemployment insurance
ﬁnanced by taxation of labour income, could generate deterministic local
indeterminacy for a wide and plausible range of elasticities of substitution
between capital and (eﬃcient) labour (for elasticities greater than a small
24lower bound), that includes in particular Cobb-Douglas production func-
tions. While raising unemployment insurance has a positive impact on the
rate of employment and can in some cases generates a Pareto welfare im-
provement for all agents along the deterministic stationary state, it increases
the likelihood to get local indeterminacy and thus possible ineﬃciencies due
to expectations coordination failures. These results are to be contrasted
with the ﬁndings obtained in the competitive case, where local indetermi-
nacy could occur only for low capital-labour elasticities of substitution (as in
GPV (1998)). One way out that has been much explored in the literature has
been to consider increasing returns through productive externalities with the
unfortunate drawback however, that their size had to be often too large to be
empirically plausible in order to get local indeterminacy (Barinci and Cheron
(2001), Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga and Pintus
(1998), Hintermaier (2003)). The results obtained in this paper suggest that
an alternative promising avenue in this respect would be to introduce unem-
ployment, conﬁrming in that other similar ﬁndings by Dufourt, Lloyd-Braga
and Modesto (2004).
These results suggest quite a few directions for future research. First,
we focused here on deterministic perfect foresight equilibria, with the con-
sequence that eﬃciency wage contracts led to a consumption and an eﬀort
levels for workers that were constant over time. This somewhat unrealistic
f e a t u r eg o e sa w a ya ss o o na sw ec o n s i d e rs t a t i o n a r ys t o c h a s t i ce n d o g e n o u s
ﬂuctuations generated by sunspots, since then workers’ consumption and
eﬀort should be random. Studying the existence and properties of such sta-
tionary rational expectations sunspots equilibria should be of interest both
from an analytical and an economic viewpoints. Analytically, existence of
these sunspot equilibria in relation with deterministic local indeterminacy is
non-standard in the sense that it does not ﬁt the general framework stud-
ied in GPV (1998, Section 3) : its study should raise interesting theoretical
issues. Economically, analyzing the time series properties of such stochastic
sunspot equilibria, and their possible connections with so-called “New Key-
nesian Economics” (Mankiw and Romer (1991)) should also raise interesting
issues. In particular, it should be of interest to analyze the dynamic prop-
erties of such unemployment business cycles depending upon whether ﬁrms
oﬀer eﬃciency wage contracts that are fully indexed on sunspots (“complete”
contracts leading to “real wage” rigidities as in Grandmont (1989)), or that
are only partially indexed or even completely predetermined (predetermined
nominal wages in the spirit of traditional disequilibrium theory as in Barro
and Grossman (1976), Benassy (1982, 2002), Dreze (1991), Grandmont and
Laroque (1976), Malinvaud (1977), Negishi (1979)). There is in fact a whole
25array of interesting possibilities along such lines, e.g. staggered eﬃciency
wage setting, whether exogenous or modeled as the rational response of ﬁrms
under the gradual diﬀusion of “sticky information” about sunspots (see Tay-
lor (1999), Mankiw and Reiss (2003)).
The analysis of this paper has been also made by relying on oversimpliﬁed
assumptions that it would be interesting to relax. One set of assumptions,
namely that workers were signiﬁcantly more impatient than capitalists, that
unemployment insurance was high, and that workers had low risk aversion,
was here to guarantee that both types of workers, whether employed or unem-
ployed, did not save more than the cash receipts (wage income or unemploy-
ment insurance) they got. While this feature led to great simpliﬁcations of
the analysis, it is somewhat extreme. By relaxing slightly these conditions,
one should get a picture where capitalists would hold capital only, unem-
ployed workers would hold money only, while employed workers would hold
both assets (money as a result of the ﬁnance constraint and capital as addi-
tional saving). Even though the analysis would be more complex technically
since one would lose the two-periods overlapping generations structure of the
workers’ behavior, that would generate a sort of heterogeneity that appears
not to be completely irrelevant and might be interesting to explore further,
by contrast with standard ”representative agent” models. Another simplify-
ing assumption we made here, namely that the probability for a worker to
get a job oﬀer in any period t was equal to the ﬁrms’ labor demand nt < 1,
and thus independent of the worker’s past employment status, should be
relaxed as it neglects important channels generating unemployment persis-
tence, such as for instance job search. Relaxing such an assumption would
allow in particular to take into account one possible negative consequence of
raising unemployment insurance that we abstracted from, namely that in-
creased unemployment compensation might lower the intensity of job search
and thus hurt employment (Baily (1978), Nicholson and Needels (2006)).
26Appendix A
We specify precisely in this appendix the inﬁnite horizon decision problem
of the agents (capitalists and workers) and the ﬁrst order Euler conditions
characterizing their choices.
At date t, capitalists have (perfect foresight) expectations of (non ran-
dom) future prices of the good pt+j > 0 and real gross rates of return on
capital Rt+j > 0 for j = 1, and observe these quantities in the current pe-
riod j =0 . They have to choose current and future consumptions ct+j,c = 0,
capital and money holdings, kt+j,c = 0 and mt+j,c = 0, for j = 0, given their
initial capital and money stocks kt−1,c > 0 and mt−1,c = 0, so as to maximize
their discounted intertemporal utility
P∞
j=0 (βc)
j Logct+j,c under the current
and expected budget constraints, for j = 0
pt+jct+j,c + pt+jkt+j,c + mt+j,c 5 pt+jRt+jkt+j−1,c + mt+j−1,c .
In view of the logarithmic instantaneous utility function, optimum consump-
tion is always positive, ct+j,c > 0. The ﬁrst order conditions (FOC) for capital
and money holdings become then
(kt+j,c = 0) ct+j+1,c = βc Rt+j+1 ct+j,c, (A.1)
(mt+j,c = 0) pt+j+1 ct+j+1,c = βc pt+j ct+j,c, (A.2)
with complementary slackness in each set of inequalities. They express as
usual that the marginal cost, in terms of the utility of foregone current
consumption, of investing at the margin in capital or money, is at least
as large as the marginal expected utility gain of increased future consump-
tion. These FOC have to be supplemented with the transversality condition
limj→∞(βc)
j (kt+j,c +( mt+j,c/pt+j))/ct+j,c =0 .
Since we focus on perfect foresight intertemporal equilibria near a station-
ary state with pt = p>0 and ct,c = cc > 0 for all t = 0, the second inequality
relative to money (A.2) will be always strict since βc < 1, so capitalists will
choose not to hold money, mt+j,c =0for all j = 0. The budget constraints
reduce then to ct+j,c +kt+j,c = Rt+j kt+j−1,c. The optimum capital stocks are
positive (to ﬁnance positive consumption) so the corresponding FOC (A.1)
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27This leads to the policy function kt+j,c/ct+j,c = βc/(1 − βc) as long as
limn→∞ β
n
ckt+j+n,c/ct+j+n,c =0 , which is in fact the transversality condition.
One gets then ctc =( 1− βc)Rtkt−1,c and ktc = βcRtkt−1,c as stated in (2.1)
in the text.
At date t, workers have (perfect foresight) expectations of (non random)
future prices of the good pt+j > 0, real gross rates of return on capital
Rt+j > 0, employment rates 0 5 nt+j < 1, eﬃciency wage contracts (wt+j,
xt+j) and wage income tax rates 0 5 1 − dt+j 5 1 for j = 1, and observe
these quantities in the current period j =0 . They determine in particular
the wage or unemployment insurance incomes of a worker at t,bt = dtwt if he
is employed or bt = dtνwt if he is not, as well as his (rational) expectations
of the corresponding random incomes in the future for j = 1,b t+j = dt+jwt+j
if he is employed at t + j (with probability nt+j), and bt+j = dt+jνwt+j if
he is not (with probability (1 − nt+j)). Workers have to choose current and
future consumptions ct+j,w = 0, capital and money holdings kt+j,w = 0 and
mt+j,w = 0 for j = 0, given their initial capital and money stocks kt−1,w = 0
and mt−1,w > 0, under the current and expected budget constraints, for j = 0
pt+jct+j,w + pt+jkt+j,w + mt+j,w 5 pt+jRt+jkt+j−1,w + mt+j−1,w + bt+j,
and the current and expected ﬁnance constraints mt+j,w = bt+j or
pt+jct+j,w + pt+jkt+j,w 5 pt+jRt+jkt+j−1,w + mt+j−1,w.
In this framework, the choices planned for any future period t + j,j =
1, i.e. (ct+j,w,k t+j,w,m t+1,w) are random since they may be aﬀected by
the random income bt+j, and may in fact depend on the whole history of
the worker’s employment status. Workers seek accordingly to maximize




(U (ct+j,w) − βwV (xt+j,w))], in which the (random) sequence xt+j,w is actu-
ally given by the expected future eﬃciency wage contracts, since it is equal
to the required eﬀort level xt+j if he is employed at t + j (with probability
nt+j) and to 0 if he is not (with probability 1 − nt+j).
In view of the Inada conditions satisﬁed by U (c) (assumption (3.b)), op-
timum consumption is always positive, ct+j,w > 0. The ﬁrst order conditions
(FOC) for capital and money holdings and for consumptions become then
for j = 0:
28(kt+j,w = 0) U0 (ct+j,w) = βwEt+j [Rt+j+1U0 (ct+j+1,w)], (A.3)






(ct+j,w > 0) λt+j + μt+j =( βw)j U0 (ct+j,w)
pt+j
, (A.5)
where λt+j > 0 and μt+j = 0 are the shadow multipliers of the budget con-
straint and the ﬁnance constraint at t+j, respectively, with complementary
slackness in each set of inequalities (A.3) and (A.4), together with the relevant
transversality condition, limj→∞ (βw)
j (kt+j,w +(mt+j,w/pt+j))U0 (ct+j,w)=0 .
These FOC express as usual that the marginal utility cost of investing in
capital or money is at least as large as the marginal expected utility gain.
As stated in the text (see (2.3)), we focus on intertemporal equilibria
near a stationary state satisfying Rt =1 /βc > 1 and such that U0 (ctw) >
βwEt [Rt+1U0 (ct+1,w)]. As made precise in the discussion following (2.4) and
in Remark 4.3, this condition will be satisﬁed ex post if βc > βw and if
U0 (c∗) > (βw/βc)U0 (νc∗), i.e. when unemployment insurance is high (ν is
close to 1) and U (c) displays low risk aversion. It implies that the inequality
(A.3) is strict, so that kt+j,w =0 , for all j = 0. Money holdings have then to
be positive in order to ﬁnance positive consumption, mt+j,w > 0, so (A.4) is
an equality for all j = 0. T h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁnance constraint is binding, or









w h i c hi sa l w a y sv e r i ﬁed near a stationary state as long as (A.3) holds, since
the deterministic sequences Rt+j+1 and pt+j/pt+j+1 are then close to 1/βc > 1
and 1 respectively. All the statements about the workers choices, in partic-
ular the fact that they display a simple two-periods overlapping generations
structure, follow then immediately.
29Appendix B
The proofs of Proposition 3.2 and Corollary 4.3 are gathered in this ap-
pendix
Proof of Proposition 3.2 : T h ei s s u ei st oﬁnd the maximum for c>c 0 of
h(c,ν)/c = V −1 (ϕ(c,ν))/c. From Lemma 3.1 and the ensuing discussion
l e a d i n gt oa s s u m p t i o n( 3 . d), h(c,ν) is a positive, increasing, strictly concave
function of c for c>c 0. It follows immediately that h(c,ν)/c is increasing
from 0 when c increases from and near c0, and globally single peaked on
(c0,+∞). Indeed the elasticity of h(c,ν)/c has the same sign as h0
c (c,ν)c−
h(c,ν), which is positive for c>c 0 close to c0, and is decreasing since its
derivative with respect to c is h00
c2 (c,ν)c<0.
The only case where h(c,ν)/c does not reach a maximum at ﬁnite distance
c∗ >c 0 would be when h(c,ν)/c is non-decreasing on (c0, + ∞). That would
imply that h(c,ν) is unbounded above, so that x =+ ∞. That would imply





should tend to −1 when c goes to +∞, since in that case c/h(c,ν) should
be non-increasing, while ϕ0
c(c,ν) would be decreasing from assumption (3.d)
and V 0(h(c,ν)) would tend to +∞ from assumption (3.a). Such a contradic-
tion shows that h(c,ν)/c reaches a maximum at ﬁnite distance c∗ >c 0.
It is obtained by setting the elasticity (B.1) equal to 0, or equivalently
c∗ϕ0
c(c∗,ν)=x∗V 0 (x∗), with x∗ = h(c∗,ν). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3 . 3 .It is clear graphically from Fig. 1 that the maximum
of h(c,ν)/c decreases when ν goes up. To verify this analytically, one must
consider the equations deﬁning implicitly c∗ and x∗ :





0 (c) − νcU
0 (νc)]. (B.3)
By total diﬀerenciation of (B.2), with all partial derivatives evaluated at the





















and proves indeed that the optimum x∗/c∗ goes down when ν increases.
To prove that c∗ goes up when ν increases, we diﬀerenciate totally (B.3)














Replacing in (B.5) dx by [ϕ0
cdc + ϕ0





















since both factors multiplying dν and dc are negative under our assumptions,
one gets indeed dc/dν > 0. Q.E.D.
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